Agricultural Policy Review, Winter 2018 by unknown
1 / Agricultural Policy Review
The Agricultural Policy Review is primarily an online publication. This printed copy is produced in limited numbers as a convenience 
only. For more information please visit the Agricultural Policy Review website at: www.card.iastate.edu/ag_policy_review.
Ames, Iowa ● Winter 2018
THE EXISTING US Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) makes commercial-scale cellulosic 
ethanol a priority, calling for 16 billion 
gallons of cellulosic biofuel production 
by 2022, sourced from grasses, trees, 
agricultural residues, and municipal 
waste. The US Department of Energy 
“US Billion-Ton Update” study (Downing 
et al. 2011) suggests that to meet the 
mandates in the RFS, approximately 
66 million tons of corn stover may be 
needed annually. This equates to nearly 
50 percent of the total annual stover 
produced by Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, 
and Nebraska (Sesmero et al. 2015).  
Stover as an energy crop 
is appealing because the 
Midwest produces a lot of it; yet 
commercialization lags behind the 
progress made in other cellulosic 
crops for two signiϐicant reasons. First, 
stover is a crop residue with a high-
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degree of variability 
that impacts product 
quality and processing 
efϐiciency, and the 
most signiϐicant cost of 
production is storage 
and transport. Tackling 
the logistical challenges 
associated with storing 
and transporting 
stover and reducing the 
system costs occupies 
a substantial portion 
of the research efforts of agricultural 
and biosystems engineers working 
in renewable energy. Second, even as 
technological innovations advance, 
commercialization may lag due to 
farmer participation—cellulosic 
processors of stover for biofuel 
report producer participation rates of 
supplying stover are 20–25 percent, 
implying that the physical availability of 
the biomass crop is a poor metric for its 
supply in the cellulosic biofuel supply 
chain. If the industry is to achieve scale 
in cellulosic biofuel from crop residues, 
particularly stover, it will need to 
solve both of these issues. Beyond the 
technological capabilities, the solution is 
with procurement and pricing contracts.
From a production standpoint, stover 
is unique from other cellulosic biomass 
crops. It is a “second crop,” not a dedicated 
biomass source, and producers do not 
manage it for yield and quality as they do 
the primary crop, corn. Also, unlike how 
producers supply corn and other grains 
as a standardized commodity at a price 
revealed daily in the marketplace, stover 
is not commoditized and no active price 
discovery mechanisms exist. Producers 
commonly assign differential values to 
the stover based on their perception 
of its contribution to soil quality and 
productivity, whether collection and 
transport are likely to interfere with fall 
ϐield operations, and other factors. Thus, 
each stover supplier potentially has a 
unique reservation value at which s/he 
will participate in the stover supply chain.
On the other side of the transaction, 
the cellulosic biofuel processor 
attempting to procure biomass faces the 
challenge of writing contracts with the 
heterogeneous suppliers who produce 
stover. In addition, stover collection 
outcomes—the product quality 
characteristics—differ substantially 
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(increased participation) and are able 
to take advantage of location rents 
resulting from higher net prices (net 
of transportation) than they would 
receive under the processor-collection 
model. The same happens in the grain 
markets—farmers nearest to the 
delivery point have a higher net price 
than those further away who receive the 
same price per bushel. When processor-
collection is used, the processor cannot 
capture the supply efϐiciencies created 
through increased participation because 
all suppliers receive an identical ϐield-
side price, and it must offer a price 
based on capturing the feedstock 
supplied furthest from the plant. 
Simply put, a tradeoff exists between 
paying a higher price for feedstock to 
increase participation near the plant 
and accepting a greater procurement 
area (see also Rosburg, Miranowski, and 
Jacobs 2016). 
The third procurement option—
differentiated pricing—was evaluated 
alongside the other two options using 
simulations. The modeling assumptions 
were based on industry engineering 
and cost factors for a cellulosic ethanol 
facility requiring 300,000 metric tons 
of stover per year, and we include 
transportation costs of $0.65 per ton 
per mile. Table 1 shows, under varying 
degrees of price-responsiveness 
by stover suppliers, how feedstock 
collection distances from the plant, 
producer participation (supply), and 
feedstock per ton prices vary for a 
ϐixed plant to meet its feedstock needs. 
As producers become more price-
responsive, collection distances fall 
and per-ton feedstock prices increase, 
inducing greater participation in 
supplying feedstock. The processor-
collection and supplier-delivery 
models generate the same collection 
distances and total costs (not shown), 
but increased participation by suppliers 
closer to the plant increases the overall 
welfare to suppliers of stover. 
across ϐields, creating variability in the 
processor’s conversion process and 
adding to production costs. 
Pricing Challenge: What is an 
Optimal contract to Procure 
Stover as a Feedstock?
One procurement option is to offer all 
stover suppliers (farmers) a single price 
per ton for biomass delivered to the 
plant—this is analogous to how grain 
is priced and leaves transportation 
costs to the supplier. Alternatively, the 
processor contracts to collect the stover 
from ϐield-side locations, bearing the 
transportation costs and paying each 
supplier a uniform per-ton price. There 
are few examples in agriculture where 
this pricing and procurement option is 
used. Cellulosic processors using stover 
feedstock in the Midwest have used 
both procurement strategies, and in 
both cases, collection regions (distances 
in miles) were signiϐicantly larger—in 
some cases up to 75 miles to supply 
the plant—than anticipated due to low 
production participation. 
Processors have not uniformly 
adopted either the supplier-delivery 
pricing model, as is familiar to 
commodity producers, or a processor-
collection pricing model, which prevails 
in more specialized markets. This leaves 
open the issue of how procurement 
markets for stover biomass will emerge 
on a commercial scale and suggests a 
third contract option—differentiated 
pricing based on the supplier’s distance 
to the plant and reservation values. In 
other markets where there is a single 
buyer (seller) transacting with many 
sellers (buyers), differentiated pricing—
or price discrimination in the economics 
nomenclature—commonly emerges. 
Given that the market has not 
identiϐied a preferred pricing structure, 
the question remains, what is the 
optimal procurement and pricing model 
for this market? We used a simple 
theory of spatial price discrimination to 
answer this question, ϐirst comparing 
the supplier-delivery and processor-
collection models. Assuming that 
suppliers and processors face identical 
transportation costs, we ϐind that 
farmer (supplier) welfare is greatest 
under the supplier-delivery model 
compared with the processor-collection 
model, even though total feedstock 
collection expenditures and draw 
areas (distances) are identical. This 
is because when supplier-delivery 
procurement is used, farmers nearest 
the plant participate more intensely 
Table 1. Simulation Results Comparing Collection Distances, Supplier 
Participation and Prices for Three Pricing and Collection Mechanisms
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Perhaps the most significant result 
relative to understanding efficient 
contracting as a mechanism for 
commercialization is that, at all levels 
of price responsiveness, the collection 
distance to meet plant capacity is 
smallest when the processor is able to 
set differential prices with suppliers. 
In that case overall collection costs 
are reduced, and as a consequence, 
overall cellulosic ethanol production 
costs are lowest of the three options. 
The highlighted row represents 
the current participation rates 
and collection distances observed 
by processors, and suggests that 
improvements are possible using a 
price-differentiated approach. 
Figure 1 depicts hypothetical 
draw regions as they might exist in 
Iowa when there is no competition for 
stover (no overlap of stover collection 
areas by different processors), based 
on plant locations in central and north-
central Iowa and recently-experienced 
Figure 1. Illustration of simulation on stover collection areas under 
different pricing mechanisms.
producer participation outcomes. When 
processors are able to use differentiated 
price contracts, collection distances 
fall along with transportation costs, 
which are primary determinants of the 
economic feasibility of cellulosic ethanol 
from stover. 
These results are important 
to policy discussion surrounding 
the RFS, both in terms of relative 
feedstock use and costs and also with 
regard to the marketing mechanisms 
and contracts that may arise as 
the industry commercializes. From 
industry experiences, we know that 
the availability of a non-dedicated 
feedstock is not equal to supply and 
processors are drawing feedstock 
from significantly larger areas than 
early studies estimated would be 
needed based on stover production. 
It is likely that this market will 
continue to show low participation by 
suppliers if processors are compelled 
to use single-price contracts, which 
result in larger procurement 
regions and lower stover prices 
per ton. One solution to this is 
price differentiation based on 
a spatial factors (i.e., suppliers’ 
distances to the processor) and also 
stover-specific and field-specific 
characteristics that influence 
processing quality and quantity. 
As a consequence of the 
current procurement and pricing 
challenges to commercializing 
stover as feedstock, meeting the RFS 
mandate for cellulosic stocks will 
likely continue to require the use 
of feedstocks such as grasses and 
other “high-cost” feedstocks that 
were previously bid out of the early 
feedstock and supply cost models. 
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Relational Contracts and the Diffusion of Agricultural 
Technologies in Brazil
by Gil DePaula 
gdepaula@iastate.edu
WHAT IS the role of the private sector in scaling agricultural technologies 
in developing countries? The Brazilian 
experience, with the soybean boom 
in the savanna and the expansion of 
the safrinha corn, suggests that the 
private sector can play a central role in 
technology diffusion, even in locations 
where credit and output markets do 
not function well. 
The constraints of the 
agricultural technology adoption 
process in developing countries 
imposes extra coordination costs for 
commercialization of new technologies. 
For example, many farmers lack 
access to credit, output markets, and 
technical assistance. Farmers could 
potentially partner with traders or 
processors who have the capabilities 
to commercialize new crops. However, 
writing a farmer-trader contract that 
accounts for several contingencies and 
that can be veriϐied by a third party is 
challenging in this context. Moreover, 
contracts involving technology 
transfer are particularly difϐicult 
to enforce given the challenges of 
measuring the transfer and the use 
of knowledge. As a result, there is 
underinvestment in technologies 
that could promote economic 
development and environmental 
beneϐits. Despite the difϐiculties, the 
diffusion of savanna soybean and the 
recent expansion of safrinha corn in 
Brazil suggest that there are some 
combinations of technologies and 
farmer-trader contracts that enable 
the private sector to rapidly scale the 
adoption of agricultural technologies 
(DePaula 2017). 
Relational Contracts and the 
Soy Boom in Brazil
In the case of the soy boom in the 
Brazilian savanna, traders and farmers 
cooperated using a special type 
of relational contract. A relational 
contract is an agreement that has 
features that are not veriϐiable or 
enforceable. Relational contracts are 
based on self-enforcing economic 
incentives and the self-enforcing 
nature of these types of agreements 
increases coordination costs (Levin 
2003). For example, a farmer could 
renege on the contract after the 
technological transfer, and a trader 
could renege on performance 
payments to the farmer. In this 
case, contracting is only feasible if it 
generates repeated proϐits sufϐiciently 
large enough that each party commits 
to a long-term partnership. The 
adaptation of a crop to production 
in marginal land can generate an 
economic surplus sufϐiciently large for 
feasible contracting.
A key feature of the farmer-trader 
contract in Brazil was the bundling 
of output price guarantees, credit, 
technology, and technical assistance. 
Before planting, the farmer commits 
to supply a speciϐic quantity of soy at 
harvest for a ϐixed price in exchange 
for inputs and ϐinancial resources to 
cover production costs. The agreement 
includes technical assistance and a 
“technological package” formed by seeds, 
fertilizers, and pesticides. In practice, 
the farmer commits a number of 60kg 
bags of soy to the trader and receives the 
resources and inputs to start planting. In 
2005, for example, one ton of fertilizers 
for soy production was worth 19.6 bags 
of soy (Silva 2012). The technological 
package represents a “recipe” for soy 
production in the savanna with inputs 
provided, and in many cases produced, 
by the trader. The contract addressed the 
multiple coordination challenges for soy 
production in the savanna.
The Adaptation of Soy Production 
to the Savanna 
The technological innovation that 
enabled soy production in the Brazilian 
Savanna (the savanna soy) was the 
development of soy seeds for low 
latitudes using biological nitrogen 
ϐixation (Hungria, Campos, and 
Mendes 2001). In the 60s, the Brazilian 
government sponsored a plant breeding 
program that combined enhanced seeds 
with nitrogen ϐixing bacteria strains. 
The seed-bacteria combination was 
developed speciϐically for poor nutrient 
soils, such as savanna soils, and led to 
new soybean varieties self-sufϐicient in 
nitrogen (Alves, Boddey, and Urquiaga 
2002). However, clearing the land and 
chemically correcting the soil can be 
very expensive; large quantities of 
lime and fertilizers are necessary to 
prepare the soil, and depending on 
the previous use of land, the clearing 
process necessary for mechanized 
farming can be very costly. Rezende 
reports a conversion cost of $600 per 
hectare in 2003, three times the cost of 
the land at the time (Rezende 2003). 
The technology enables soy production 
in marginal land in large scale but also 
requires high upfront investment.
The Contracting Effect
The Brazilian government was initially 
heavily involved in the soy industry 
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Figure 1. Agricultural land transfer to different types of entities 
Notes: Expansion is measured in terms of planted area. The planted area for the savanna soy includes the Midwest 
region of Brazil and the new agriculture frontier represented by the states of Maranhao, Tocantins, Piaui, e Bahia 
(MATOPIBA).
Source: Conab, 2018. continued on page 13
through the development of new 
technologies and the ϐinancing of 
production, but since the economic 
crises in the 80s, followed by the 
implementation of market reforms in 
the mid-90s, the industry transitioned 
to a market-oriented model with the 
expansion of the role of international 
trading corporations. The trading 
companies followed a consistent 
strategy of vertical integration of the soy 
supply chain, through investments in 
the production and commercialization 
of fertilizers, and direct ϐinancing of 
farmers through anticipated sales 
contracts. Traders offered farmers 
a package of services that included 
ϐinancing, price guarantees, technical 
assistance and inputs for production, 
to guarantee supply of soy at required 
quality levels (Junior 2011). Figure 1 
shows the historical expansion of the 
savanna soy technology measured in 
millions of acres of planted area. The 
expansion of savanna soy progressed 
slowly for 40 years before the market 
reforms in the mid-90s. In contrast, in 
the 20-year period from 1996 to 2016, 
production of savanna soy boomed 
with an additional 37 million acres of 
plantations, an area of the size of Iowa. 
The Brazilian soy boom presents 
a well-suited case for the examination 
of the beneϐits of a novel farmer-trader 
contract on technological diffusion, 
the contracting effect. I combine farm-
level data from the 1996 and 2006 
Brazilian agricultural census surveys 
to disentangle the contribution of 
contracting from the contribution of 
other drivers of technology adoption in 
Brazil. I ϐind that the contracting effect 
varies signiϐicantly across farm types 
and locations in Brazil. Contracting 
explained over 80 percent of soy 
expansion in the Savanna frontier 
in locations where there was no soy 
production before the introduction of 
the contract. In contrast, in locations 
where soy was previously produced, 
contracting explained 37 percent of 
soy expansion. Contracting increased 
total value of agricultural output by 
200 percent in the agricultural frontier 
and by 65 percent in traditional 
producing locations (DePaula 2017). 
The savanna soy technology diffused 
faster in locations were the total 
economic surplus from contracting 
was larger, either because of high 
yield improvement or because of high 
production costs without contracting. 
Policy Implications
The scaling of agricultural technologies 
in developing countries depends on the 
feasibility of contracting. Cost-beneϐit 
studies of agricultural innovations 
should consider coordination costs 
between commercial partners, as 
ignoring these difϐicult-to-measure 
expenses could overstate the potential 
proϐitability and diffusion of new 
technologies. Public policy can inϐluence 
the propensity for contracting. In 
particular, policies that improve 
protection of property rights and 
contract enforcement can not only 
increase the feasibility of contracting, 
increasing private sector investments, 
but can also affect the distribution of 
rents from contracting between farmers 
and traders.
The Brazilian experience does 
not end with the soy expansion in 
the savanna. In the last two decades, 
the diffusion of safrinha corn, a new 
production system for cultivation 
of corn as a second-season crop, is 
changing commercial agriculture in 
Brazil. In the 10-year period from 2006 
to 2016, the area planted with safrinha 
corn increased by about 20 million 
acres, an area close to the size of South 
Carolina. The speciϐic features of the 
commercial agreements that accelerated 
the diffusion of safrinha corn are the 
subject of ongoing research.
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USDA’s Projections for 2018
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Table 1. Corn Supply and Use
US AGRICULTURE continues on an amazing productivity run. The last ϐive corn crops are the 
ϐive largest ever produced. The last 
four soybean crops are the four largest 
ever. Meat production exceeded the 
$100 billion mark for the ϐirst time. The 
question going forward for the markets 
is, “Will this streak continue next year?” 
USDA has provided its outlook for 2018 
and the answer seems to be “Yes.”
Of course, at this point, we do 
not know what weather patterns will 
appear or how agricultural demands 
might adjust over the next 18 months. 
Thus, the USDA outlook is based on 
current trends in production and usage. 
However, those current trends suggest 
the run of large crops and growing meat 
production is not over yet and crop 
price recovery may be still a ways off. 
Crop acreage is concentrating in corn 
and soybean production, as other crops 
still are not offering signiϐicant enough 
returns to pull farmland back to those 
other crops. As has been the case for 
the last few years, projected corn and 
soybean returns are not very attractive, 
but they are better than those offered by 
other crops.
The early estimate for corn acreage 
shows a slight increase in 2018, moving 
up to 91 million acres, as shown in 
Table 1. With the national trendline 
yield set at 173.5 bushels per acre, that 
translates to corn production remaining 
above 14.5 billion bushels. In fact, the 
projected 2018 corn crop would be the 
third-largest ever and total corn supply 
would exceed 17 billion bushels for the 
ϐirst time ever.
Corn usage is projected to remain 
strong as well, but it is still just below 
expected production. Feed and residual 
use is expected to decline slightly, 
which, as livestock production is 
increasing, is probably more about 
residual usage than feed demand. Corn 
usage for ethanol is set to reach another 
record next year. Domestic use of E-15 
is rising and ethanol exports have been 
robust. Food, seed, and other uses 
continue to rise. The weakest demand 
sector is export. With global supplies 
of not only corn, but also other feed 
grains, at extremely high levels, US 
corn is facing a lot of competition in the 
international marketplace. With total 
usage projected at nearly 14.5 billion 
bushels, corn demand is doing what 
it can to lift prices. However, ending 
stocks are expected to rise slightly, 
reaching 2.6 billion bushels, and corn 
prices are projected to stay lower. The 
initial estimate for the 2018/19 season-
average prices is $3.30 per bushel.
The projections for soybeans show 
that this year’s run to beans was no one-
year phenomenon. As shown in Table 2, 
USDA projects 91 million acres will be 
planted to soybeans in 2018, essentially 
tying with corn for the most acreage. 
The 2018 trend yield is 48.4 bushels 
per acre, which would result in 4.36 
billion bushels of soybeans. That would 
be the second-largest crop, behind this 
year. Paralleling corn, with the increase 
production of the last few years, ending 
stocks have grown and that will push 
total soybean supplies to 4.85 billion 
bushels, the highest total ever.
Soybean use has been trending 
higher the last several years, with 
records being set each succeeding 
year. The estimates for 2018 continue 
that run. Domestic crush is set at 1.97 
billion bushels, up 20 million from this 
year. This is being driven by soybean 
meal demand by livestock and soybean 
oil use in the biodiesel industry. The 
increase in acreage implies additional 
seed use, so seed and residual usage is 
raised slightly. However, the big story 
remains exports—while exports for 
the 2017 crop are down slightly, USDA 
shows a rebound back to record exports 
in 2018.
Current corn futures would 
normally translate to a 2018/19 
season-average price around $3.80 per 
bushel. Current soybean futures point 
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Table 2. Soybean Supply and Use
Table 3. Meat Production and Livestock Prices
Table 4. Meat Exports
continued on page 12
to season-average prices in $9.70-$9.80 
range. Those projections are, however, 
likely misleading as the cash markets will 
maintain wide-than-normal basis levels. 
The larger stock levels are hampering 
basis improvement, which will not occur 
until some of the supplies are cleared 
from the market. Given current basis 
levels, projections for the 2018/19 
crop margins would be slightly below 
breakeven for both crops, continuing 
another streak that is not as pleasant as 
the record production run. It is often said 
that the cure for low prices is low prices. 
However, that cure has not taken affect 
yet and the USDA projections indicate 
that will at least be another year before it 
kicks in.
For the livestock sector, expansion 
is projected in all of the major product 
groups, as shown in Table 3. Beef 
production is set to be six percent 
higher and pork production will grow 
by ϐive percent. Broiler production will 
climb to nearly 42.5 billion pounds and 
turkey production will reach six billion 
pounds. For the livestock industry, 
2017 turned out to be a good year with 
record production, but also solid returns 
as prices held up despite the surge in 
production. The price projections for 
2018 show lower prices, but the drops 
in prices are being offset by the gains in 
production.
Moving forward, concerns will center 
on the pace of expansion. For example, 
the latest Hogs & Pigs report from USDA 
highlighted the steady pace of growth in 
both the number of farrowings and the 
number of pigs per litter. A slight uptick 
in either of those trends would accelerate 
pork production, potentially beyond the 
current pace of pork consumption.
Much of what is driving this 
expansion originates from the 
international marketplace—meat exports 
were robust in 2017 and the early 
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Can China’s Rural Land Policy Reforms Solve 
its Farmland Dilemma?
by Minghao Li, Wendong Zhang, and Dermot Hayes 
minghao@iastate.edu; wdzhang@iastate.edu; dhayes@iastate.edu
Figure 1. Agricultural land transfer to different types of entities 
Note: 2017 data is mid-year value while all others are end-of-year values. 
Sources: Data before 2010 are from chinaaidr.com (2018), 2010~15 data are from Agricultural Development 
Reports, 2016~17 data are from MOA (2018).
THE SCARCITY of arable land is a deϐining feature of Chinese agriculture (Zhang and Li 
2018). In 2015, China fed 18.9 percent 
of the world’s population with only 
8.5 percent of the world’s arable land. 
Furthermore, the limited agricultural 
land resource in China is distributed 
to 231 million households, resulting in 
an average farm size of only 0.96 acres 
per household (China Agricultural 
Development Report 2016), and even 
such small farms are usually scattered 
in several separate plots. Therefore, 
China faces two challenges: (a) 
preserving the quantity and quality of 
its arable land amid rapid urbanization; 
and, (b) consolidating land to increase 
agricultural productivity. China’s recent 
rural land reforms on these two aspects 
have implications not only for China, but 
the entire world.
Rural Land Conversion for Urban 
Use: National Policy and Local 
Innovation  
To achieve food security, the Chinese 
government tightly controls the net 
amount of arable land converted to 
other uses, with the overall goal of 
maintaining at least 307 million arable 
acres (called the “redline”) by 2020. In 
addition to the annual quota allocated 
by the central government, additional 
arable land converted to other uses has 
to be compensated by new arable land 
of at least equal area. 
As environmental regulations 
tighten, the Chinese government 
increasingly turns to rural construction 
land, such as that beneath farmhouses, 
for compensation for converted arable 
land (State Council 2004). Currently, 
most regions in China achieve this kind 
of compensation through administrative 
means (Southern Weekend 2010). 
Local governments choose the locations 
and move farmers from sprawling 
farmhouses to high-rise buildings 
and re-cultivate the land beneath the 
original farmhouses to arable land. 
The farmers lose their farmhouses 
(including future development rights), 
retain the land use right of the land 
beneath farmhouses for agricultural 
production, and gain an apartment 
and/or monetary compensations. The 
increases in arable land become permits 
for local governments to convert arable 
land near cities for urban development 
and sell urban land use rights for 
revenue.    
The city of Chongqing has 
experimented with an innovative 
market-oriented process featuring 
“land tickets” (Chongqing Municipal 
Government 2016). Farmers in remote 
rural areas can voluntarily consolidate 
farmhouses and re-cultivate arable 
land. In doing so, they create “land 
tickets” which are then auctioned off to 
developers as permits to develop arable 
land near the city. The key difference 
between Chongqing and the rest of 
China is that farmers’ decisions to 
convert land beneath their farmhouses 
to arable land, and the compensation 
for the conversion, is determined by the 
market as opposed to command-and-
control (although the city government 
often buys large amounts of “land 
tickets” to prevent the price from 
crashing). This innovation has the 
potential to increase the equity and 
efϐiciency of land conversions.
Rural Land Transfer Reform and 
the Booming Rental Market
Small farm size and low productivity 
can be ameliorated by letting farmers 
transfer farmland to others for 
agricultural production. Rural land 
transfer has been permitted since the 
1980s and has increasingly gained 
government support over the years. 
In 2002, the Land Contract Law of 
China conϐirmed the right for farmers 
to transfer land use rights. As Figure 2 
shows, the total amount of land transfer 
increased from ϐive percent of arable 
land in 2007 to 36.5 percent in 2017. An 
important driving force for this increase 
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Who owns China’s farmland?
Private land ownership is banned in China. Under China’s 
current Household Responsibility System (HRS), started in 
the early 1980s, all rural land is owned by rural collectives, 
which allocate contract rights for parcels of farmland to 
eligible households. The tenure of contract rights was 15 
years in 1983, renewed for 30 years in 1997, and again by 30 
years (i.e., starting 2027) in China’s 19th Party Congress in 
2017 (NPC 2017).
Chinese Farmers Can:
 Decide what to plant and how
 Keep returns from their agricultural production
 Lease their land to others for agricultural production
Chinese Farmers Cannot:
 Convert agricultural land to other uses
 Leave their land uncultivated for more than two years
 Legally resist land acquisition
is that migrant farmers want to work in 
cities while keeping their land at home.
 The majority of land transfers 
happen between farmers. For example, 
migrant farmers may let friends or 
relatives farm their land. These kinds 
of transfers often rely on informal 
agreements, and usually involve zero 
or very low payments. Although not 
land rental per se, these informal 
transfers lay the ground for the future 
development of the rental market by 
consolidating small plots and making 
them attractive to large-scale farms. 
Currently, land transfers to ϐirms 
represent 10.5 percent of all transfers 
(or 3.8 percent of all arable land), 
but their growth has been slow in 
recent years. An important factor is 
that property rights of rural land are 
insecure and unclear. This is manifested 
in inaccurate land borders and sizes, 
incomplete land use right certiϐicates, 
and limited HRS tenure (see ϐirst text 
box). The Chinese government just 
extended HRS tenure to 2057, and is 
in the process of issuing land use right 
certiϐicates with more accurate land 
position and size information. This 
effort is expected to boost the land 
rental market in the future.
Implications for China’s Crop 
and Livestock Industries
The percentage of urban population 
in China increased from 19 percent 
in 1980 to 57 percent in 2016 (China 
Statistical Year Book 2017), and is 
continuing its upward trend. Despite 
signiϐicant demand for farmland acres 
to be converted for urban development, 
China has successfully maintained the 
quantity of its arable land in recent 
years (China Agricultural Development 
Report 2017). This is due to policies 
that compensate arable land lost to 
development by creating arable land 
somewhere else, often by converting 
farmhouses to arable land. The fact that 
returning rural construction land to 
cropland can generate valuable permits 
for urban development somewhere 
else creates additional opportunity 
cost for facilities for animal production. 
This opportunity cost is ϐirst felt by 
municipal governments who depend on 
selling development rights for revenue. 
In most of China, local governments 
restrict or delay the approval of new 
animal production facilities, especially 
those with a larger footprint, mandate 
the conversion of farmhouses to arable 
land, and move farmers into high-rise 
buildings. In Chongqing, farmers also 
have this opportunity cost because they 
can create and sell permits themselves 
by voluntarily converting their 
farmhouses to cropland. Therefore, 
no matter how the system is designed 
speciϐically, the overall effect is to make 
animal production more expensive. 
While this affects all producers, the 
negative effects will be stronger on 
small, low-proϐit producers. 
The increased opportunity cost 
for animal production is especially 
relevant for the hog industry. In 
southern China, land available for hog 
production is already so scarce that 
some hogs are produced in high-rise 
buildings, a phenomenon unheard of in 
the United States (Agweb.com 2017). 
Furthermore, in order to protect the 
environment, the government has 
designated areas where hog production 
is restricted (USDA 2017). The extreme 
land scarcity and the increasing cost 
of environmental compliance will 
compound with increased opportunity 
cost of maintaining the facility and limit 
hog production. 
Similarly, the development of the 
rental market gives less productive 
crop producers an incentive to quit 
agricultural production. Currently, 
renting farmland is popular with 
farmer households, but offers limited 
appeal to ϐirms. The current reform 
that clariϐies property rights may draw 
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Is ARC-CO acting as a Safety Net Program? 
Evidence from Iowa
by Alejandro Plastina and Chad Hart
plastina@iastate.edu; chart@iastate.edu
THE AGRICULTURAL Act of 2014, referred to as the 2014 Farm Bill, is the legislative backbone of 
federal farm income support programs 
and agricultural disaster assistance 
programs. These programs, combined 
with federal crop insurance, are what is 
typically referred to as the farm safety 
net. As the debate has begun for the 
next version of the Farm Bill, policy 
discussions have centered on improving 
the effectiveness of the safety net. 
However, in previous Farm Bills, there 
had been a concerted effort to utilize 
decoupled agricultural support to ensure 
that US farm programs would meet World 
Trade Organization (WTO) standards. 
The commodity programs in the 1996 
and 2002 Farm Bills were led by the 
direct payment programs—essentially 
ϐixed decoupled payments that ϐlowed to 
agricultural producers, regardless of the 
agricultural economy. In the 2008 and 
2014 Farm Bills, commodity programs 
were modiϐied to react to conditions in 
the agricultural economy. Congress must 
determine how to balance decoupled 
agricultural programs, which are less 
responsive to the agricultural economy 
but more accepted in the WTO, against 
safety net agricultural programs, which 
are more responsive but also seen as 
more trade distorting. 
Current commodity programs 
include the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) 
and the Agricultural Risk Coverage 
(ARC) programs. PLC provides payments 
when low prices occur and it can be 
considered a price safety net program. 
The ARC program at the Individual Level 
(ARC-IC) provides coverage against low 
income for an operation, and it can also 
be considered a farm revenue safety net 
program. The ARC program at the County 
Level (ARC-CO) is based on area revenue, 
decoupled from farm yields and prices. 
ARC-CO can be considered a revenue 
safety net program, but given the 
decoupling from farm yields and prices, 
its effectiveness is an open question. In 
fact, ARC-CO can be characterized as a 
lottery of government payments with 
probability of payment less than one, 
equal prizes per base acre within each 
county, and great variability in prizes 
across county lines. However, ARC-CO 
is a very popular program. Base acres 
enrolled in ARC-CO account for 75 
percent of total program base acres 
in the nation. Furthermore, 92 and 96 
percent of corn and soybean base acres 
are enrolled in the ARC-CO program. 
The accumulated ARC-CO payments for 
corn and soybean base acres in 2015 
and 2016 amount to nearly $9.2 billion, 
and represent 89 percent of all ARC-CO 
payments for all covered commodities, 
and 71 percent of all ARC-CO and PLC 
payments in the nation over the same 
period. Many farmers, in essence, traded 
the direct payment program for ARC-
CO. Did their trade result in a better 
safety net for agriculture? Plastina and 
Hart (2018) explore this question by 
analyzing the distribution of ARC-CO 
payments across different groups of 
mid-sized commercial Iowa farms with 
different income levels, proϐit levels, 
as well as liquidity and solvency levels. 
We summarize the evidence pointing 
towards a disconnection between ARC-CO 
payments and farm incomes and proϐits 
reported in Plastina and Hart (2018).
The database contains nearly 700 
observations of mid-sized commercial 
farms actively managed from 55 of 
Iowa’s 99 counties, and all agricultural 
districts in Iowa, and covers the 
production and ϐinancial aspects of the 
farms. Each point in the database is a 
farm-year combination and accounts 
for ARC-CO payments made in 2015 and 
2016 (corresponding, respectively, to 
crop years 2014/15 and 2015/16). 
ARC-CO Payments by Crop Income
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics 
of ARC-CO payments per acre by 
crop income (accrued) per acre in 
the previous year for all farm-year 
combinations (those that received or 
did not receive payments). Per acre 
incomes and payments are examined 
to remove the effect of farm size from 
the analysis. The median payment 
for all categories was zero, and the 
average payments tended to increase 
with the level of crop income in the 
previous year. This is counterintuitive 
for a safety net program, as one would 
likely expect lower incomes to be paired 
with higher program payments. A 
pairwise comparison of average ARC-CO 
payments for all farm-year combinations 
(those that received or did not receive 
payments) across groups of farms using 
Tukey’s Studentized Range (HSD) tests 
at the ϐive percent conϐidence level, 
which indicates that: (a) farms with the 
As the debate has begun 
for the next version 
of the Farm Bill, 
policy discussions have 
centered on improving 
the eﬀ ectiveness of 
the safety net. 
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largest crop income per acre (>$800) 
received signiϐicantly higher ARC-CO 
payments per acre than farms with up to 
$600 in crop income per acre—$9.16 vs. 
$1.84, respectively; (b) farms with crop 
income between $700 and $800 per acre 
received signiϐicantly higher ARC-CO 
payments per acre than farms with up 
to $600 in crop income per acre—$7.30 
vs. $1.84, respectively. All other pairwise 
comparisons across groups of farms with 
known crop incomes in the previous 
years are not statistically signiϐicant.
Table 2 shows the descriptive 
statistics of ARC-CO payments by crop 
income (accrued) in the previous year 
only for those farm-year combinations 
that received payments. A similar pattern 
to that in Table 1 is observed, as average 
payments tend to increase with the 
level of crop income in the previous 
year. A pairwise comparison of average 
ARC-CO corn and soybean payments 
per acre across farms grouped by crop 
income in the previous year using HSD 
Table 1. ARC-CO Corn and Soybean Payments per Operated Crop Acre by 
Crop Income per Acre in Previous Year for All Farm-year Combinations
Table 2. ARC-CO Corn and Soybean Payments per Operated Crop Acre by 
Crop Income per Acre in Previous Year For Farm-year Combinations That 
Received Payments in 2015 and 2016
tests at the ϐive percent conϐidence level 
indicates that: (a) the average payment 
for the group of farms with more than 
$800 in crop income per acre, $53.22, 
is signiϐicantly larger than the average 
payment received by farms with crop 
income up to $600 per acre, $24.08, and 
farms with crop income between $600 
and $700 per acre, $33.49; (b) average 
payments for the three groups of farms 
with up to $800 in crop income per acre 
($24.08, $33.49, and $37.26) are not 
signiϐicantly different among themselves.
Since ARC-CO payments tend to 
increase with crop incomes in the 
previous year, the ARC-CO program seems 
to fail at protecting farmers against low 
incomes. In fact, operators with higher 
incomes are the ones who tend to capture 
the higher payments under ARC-CO. 
ARC-CO Payments by Crop Profi ts
Crop proϐits are calculated by subtracting 
accrued operating expenses and 
economic depreciation (on machinery 
and equipment and buildings and 
improvements) from crop income 
(accrual). Proϐits equal the net farm 
income that is used to compensate unpaid 
family labor, plus returns to equity and 
management. As with crop incomes, the 
crop proϐits are examined on a per acre 
basis to remove farm size effects.
Table 3 shows the descriptive 
statistics of ARC-CO payments by crop 
proϐits in the previous year for all 
farm-year combinations. The median 
payment for all categories was zero. 
A pairwise comparison of average 
ARC-CO payments for all farm-year 
combinations across groups of farms 
using HSD tests at the ϐive percent 
conϐidence level indicates that: (a) the 
average payment for the group of farms 
with crop proϐits larger than $150 per 
acre, $12.67, is signiϐicantly larger than 
the corresponding averages for the four 
groups of farms with proϐits up to $100 
per acre—$3.08, $5.39, $4.43, $and 
$3.60; (b) the average payment for the 
group of farms with crop proϐits between 
$100 and $150 per acre is signiϐicantly 
larger than the corresponding average 
for the group of farms with crop losses 
of up to $50 per acre—$11.19 vs. 
$3.08, respectively. All other pairwise 
comparisons across groups of farms 
with known crop proϐits in the previous 
years are not statistically signiϐicant. 
Once again, the results are generally the 
opposite of what one would expect from 
a safety net program. Those farmers with 
the lowest crop proϐits (or largest crop 
losses) tended to receive less from ARC-
CO than farmers with better proϐitability.
Table 4 shows the descriptive 
statistics of ARC-CO payments by 
crop proϐits in the previous year only 
for those farm-year combinations 
that received payments. A pairwise 
comparison of average ARC-CO corn 
and soybean payments across farms 
grouped by crop proϐits fails to ϐind 
signiϐicant differences using HSD tests 
continued on page 13
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USDA’s Projections for 2018
continued from page 7
 Can China’s Rural Land Policy Reforms Solves its 
Farmland Dilemma?
continued from page 9
Key Policies Governing Land Use 
and Conversion in China
 The “Redline” of farmland is 
the lowest limit of arable land 
in 2020, about 300 million 
acres, set by the Chinese 
government in 2006.
 Permanent basic cropland 
is the 255 million acres of 
designated high cropland 
that is subjected to stricter 
protection from conversion to 
urban use.
 The “Increase-decrease 
linkage” policy  (started 
in 2006) allows local 
governments to convert 
certain amounts of arable 
land to urban uses if they 
create an equal or larger 
amount of arable land from 
rural construction land (e.g. 
farmhouses).
 The “Grain for green” 
(started in 1999) policy 
returns marginal farmland in 
ecologically sensitive areas to 
forestry.
numbers for 2018 are encouraging. 
Table 4 displays USDA’s projections and, 
as with production, the numbers are 
higher across the board. Both pork and 
beef enjoyed roughly 10 percent export 
growth in 2017. Beef is expected to gain 
another four percent in 2018, while 
pork is projected to grow ϐive percent 
during the year. Broiler and turkey 
exports are expected to grow as well.
Thus, the underlying agricultural 
story for 2018 may be due to the global 
demand for meat. Currently, the surge 
in meat consumption globally has 
improved livestock market returns 
and led to signiϐicant increases in 
production. That is, in turn, providing 
support for the crop markets, at a time 
when those markets need a usage 
boost. Combined, the projections 
indicate a slight improvement in the 
US agricultural economy, but the 
emphasis is on the word “slight.” Price 
improvement is a hard thing to come by 
when records continue to be set on the 
production side.
more ϐirms into agriculture and further 
boost productivity. Studies have found 
that land productivity dramatically 
increases after transfers (e.g., by 60 
percent according to Jin and Klaus’ 
2009 estimate). Overall, we believe the 
recent developments in China’s land 
policy are pushing both crop and animal 
production toward larger scales.
Data Sources and References:
Brown, Sara. 2017. “China’s High-rise Hog 
Hotel.” Agweb.com. 
https://www.agweb.com/article/chinas-
high-rise-hog-hotel-naa-sara-brown/ 
China Agricultural Development Report 2016 
(Chinese)
China Statistical Yearbook. 2007. (Chinese) 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2017/
indexch.htm
Chinaidr.com. 2018. “The Current 
Upscale Operations in Chinese 
Agriculture and Future Development.” 
(Chinese) http://www.chinaidr.com/
tradenews/2018-01/117465.html
Chongqing Municipal Government. 2016. The 
Methods to Administrate Land Tickets. 
(Chinese)
Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO). 2018. Land Use Data 
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/RL
Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). 2018. “Current 
Rural Operation and Management.”
http://www.jgs.moa.gov.cn/txjsxxh/201801/
t20180105_6134218.htm
Southern Weekend. 2010. “Forcing 
Farmer into High-rise Buildings may be 
Unconstitutional.” 
http://www.infzm.com/content/52105
State Council. 2004. “State Council’s Decision 
to Deepen Reform and to Apply Stricter 
Land Management.” http://www.gov.cn/
zwgk/2005-08/12/content_22138.htm
United Nations Population Division. 2017. 
“World Population Prospects 2017.” 
https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/
Standard/Population/ 
United States Department of Agriculture 
Foreign Agriculture Service. 2017. “China: 
Livestock and Products Semi-annual.” 
https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/china-
livestock-and-products-semi-annual-2
Zhang, W. and M. Li. 2018. “Navigating the 
Chinese Agricultural Economy through the 
Lens of Iowa.” Ag Decision Maker, February 
2018. 
Agricultural Policy Review / 13
at the ϐive percent conϐidence level. This 
slightly modiϐies the previous pattern, 
as once ARC-CO payments are triggered, 
they are roughly shared equally across 
the proϐit spectrum. In terms of crop 
proϐitability, the ARC-CO payments act 
more like decoupled payments in those 
counties where payments are triggered, 
and less like a safety net for all farms. 
Conclusions
Using farm-level data from Iowa, we 
found no support to the hypotheses 
that ARC-CO payments would be larger 
for farms with lower incomes or lower 
proϐits. On the contrary, we found 
support that ARC-CO payments tend 
to be larger for farms with higher crop 
incomes and proϐits in the previous year. 
In summ ary, ARC-CO payments, instead 
of acting as a safety net for Iowa farmers, 
can be more accurately characterized as 
decoupled support for farms located in 
counties where payments are triggered, 
but without the consistency of previous 
programs, such as the direct payment 
program. In the end, farmers traded the 
certainty of the direct payment program 
for a lottery of government payments 
with probability of payment less than 
one, equal prizes per base acre within 
each county and great variability in 
prizes across county lines.
Acknowledgements
The authors greatly appreciate the ongoing 
collaboration between the Iowa Farm Busi-
ness Association and Iowa State University 
Extension and Outreach. The views ex-
pressed are those of the authors and should 
not be attributed to Iowa State University 
or the Iowa Farm Business Association. 
This study was partly funded in part by the 
Hatch/Multi-State Project IOW05521 and 
Hatch/NIFA Project Number 1010309.
Reference
Plastina, A., and C. Hart. 2018. “Is ARC-CO 
acting as a Safety Net Program? Evidence 
from Iowa.” Choices (forthcoming). 
Table 3. ARC-CO Corn and Soybean Payments per Operated Crop Acre by 
Profi ts in Corn and Soybean Enterprises in Previous Year for All Farm-year 
Combinations
Table 4. ARC-CO Corn and Soybean Payments per Operated Crop Acre by 
Level of Profi t in Corn and Soybean Enterprises in Previous Year for Farm-
year Combinations That Received Payments in 2015 and 2016
Is ARC-CO acting as a Safety Net Program? 
continued from page 11
Relational Contracts and the Diff usion of 
Agricultural Technologies in Brazil
continued from page 5
Hungria, Mariangela, Rubens José Campo, 
and I. de C. Mendes. 2001. “Fixação 
Biológica do Nitrogênio na Cultura da 
Soja.” Embrapa Soja; Brasília, DF: Embrapa 
Cerrados.
Junior, Valdemar João Wesz. 2011. “Dinâmicas 
e Estratégias das Agroindústrias de Soja no 
Brasil”. Vol. 4. Editora E-papers.
Levin, Jonathan. 2003. “Relational Incentive 
Contracts.” The American Economic Review 
93(3): 835–57. 
Rezende, Christiane Leles. 2008. “Pacta Sunt 
Servanda? Quebra Dos Contratos de Soja 
Verde.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Universidade de 
São Paulo.
Silva, Felipe Prince. 2012. “Financiamento 
da Cadeia de Gãos no Brasil: O Papel das 
Tradings e Fornecedores de Insumos.” 
www.card.iastate.edu
Editorial Staff
Nathan Cook
  Managing Editor
Curtis Balmer
  Web Manager
Rebecca Olson
  Publication Design
Editor
Catherine L. Kling
  CARD Director
Iowa State University does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, age, ethnicity, religion, 
national origin, pregnancy, sexual orientation, gender identity, genetic information, sex, marital 
status, disability, or status as a U.S. veteran. Inquiries can be directed to the Interim Assistant 
Director of Equal Opportunity and Compliance, 3280 Beardshear Hall, (515) 294-7612.
The Agricultural Policy Review 
is a quarterly newsletter published by 
the Center for Agricultural and Rural 
Development (CARD). This publication 
presents summarized results that emphasize 
the implications of ongoing agricultural 
policy analysis of the near-term agricultural 
situation, and discussion of agricultural 
policies currently under consideration.
Georgeanne M. Artz
Edward J. Balistreri
John Crespi
Gil Depaula
Amani Elobeid
Chad Hart
Dermot Hayes
Keri L. Jacobs
Helen Jensen
David A. Keiser
Gabriel E. Lade
GianCarlo Moschini
Alejandro Plastina
Sebastien Pouliot
Lee L. Schulz
Wendong Zhang
Advisory Committee
Articles may be reprinted with permission 
and with appropriate attribution. Contact the 
managing editor at the above e-mail or call 
515-294-3809.
Subscription is free and available on-line. To 
sign up for an electronic alert to the newsletter 
post, go to www. card.iastate.edu/ag_policy_
review/subscribe and submit your information.
